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Abstract
Discrete exponential operation, such as modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication on elliptic
curves, is a basic operation of many public-key cryptosystems. However, the exponential operations are
considered prohibitively expensive for resource-constrained mobile devices. In this paper, we address
the problem of secure outsourcing of exponentiation operations to one single untrusted server. Our
proposed scheme (ExpSOS) only requires very limited number of modular multiplications at local
mobile environment thus it can achieve impressive computational gain. ExpSOS also provides a secure
verification scheme with probability approximately 1 to ensure that the mobile end-users can always
receive valid results. The comprehensive analysis as well as the simulation results in real mobile device
demonstrates that our proposed ExpSOS can significantly improve the existing schemes in efficiency,
security and result verifiability. We apply ExpSOS to securely outsource several cryptographic protocols
to show that ExpSOS is widely applicable to many cryptographic computations.
Index Terms
Mobile cloud computing, secure outsourcing, modular exponentiation, scalar multiplication, result
verification
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing provides end-users the capability to securely access the shared pool of resources
such as computational power and storage. It enables end-users to utilize those resources in a pay-
per-use manner. Among all types of computations, exponential operation in a finite group is almost
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2ubiquitous in public-key cryptosystems. However, due to large integers involved, exponentiation is con-
sidered prohibitively expensive for resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones. Thus, outsourcing
exponentiation operation to the cloud servers becomes an appealing choice.
However, when sensitive data is outsourced to the untrusted cloud, security of the data as well as the
result is at risk. Moreover, many cryptographic applications, such as digital signature, require to verify
the validity of the results of modular exponentiation. Thus result verification is also a crucial issue. In
contrast, the cloud cannot be fully trusted for at least three reasons. First, the cloud could be curious.
That is, it may try to “mine” as much information as possible from the outsourced data. Second, the
computational resource is commodity. The cloud has the motivation to cheat in the computation process
in order to save computational resources. Third, the cloud is a shared environment. It is hard to secure
individual data using just regular processor. Thus, security and verifiability are two major concerns for
computation outsourcing.
To address these two issues, various computation outsourcing mechanisms have been proposed, includ-
ing outsourcing of modular exponentiation operations [1]–[10]. In [8], the authors considered outsourcing
modular exponentiation to two servers assuming that they would not collude. The basic idea of the
proposed scheme in [8] is to split the base and exponent of modular exponentiation into random looking
pieces that are separately outsourced to two servers. Then the end-user can combine the results returned
by the servers to recover the desired result. Under this scheme, the end-user can check the validity of
the returned results with probability 12 . Following [8], the authors in [9] proposed a similar scheme and
improved the performance by reducing one query to the servers and increasing the verifiability to 23 . In
order to eliminate the assumption that the two servers would not collude, the authors in [10] proposed
a scheme to outsource modular exponentiation to one single server. However, at local side, the end-user
still needs to carry out some exponentiation operations. As a result, the computational gain is limited
for the end-user. Moreover, all these three schemes rely on pre-computation of modular exponentiation
of some random integers. This will cause extra overhead to end-user’s limited computational power or
storage space depending on the method by which pre-computation is implemented.
From the above analysis of several previous schemes, we can summarize some basic requirements of
secure outsourcing of modular exponentiation. First, for the system model, it is much more desirable to
outsource exponentiation operations to one single server instead of two servers with security based on the
assumption that two servers would not collude. Second, the secure outsourcing scheme should not impose
expensive computational overhead at local side. Otherwise, the performance gain from outsourcing would
diminish. Third, the scheme should provide a high verifiability. Ideally, the end-user should be able to
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3verify the validity of the returned result with probability 1.
In this paper, we extend the notion of exponentiation from modular exponentiation to general expo-
nential operations in a finite group, including scalar multiplication on elliptic curves. In general, each
exponential operation consists of a series of basic group operations. The number of such operations varies
with the exponent. In this sense, modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication can both be regarded
as exponentiation operations. Thus, we propose a Secure Outsourcing Scheme for general Exponential
(ExpSOS) operations. The proposed ExpSOS is based on ring homomorphism. Specifically, we map the
integers in the ring RN to the ring RL so that the computation in RL is homomorphic to that in RN . We
let the cloud carry out the computation in RL and from the result returned by the cloud, the end-user
is able to recover the result back to RN efficiently. The ring homomorphism has two features: i) the
mapping between RN and RL is computationally efficient, and ii) without possessing the secret key, it is
computationally infeasible to derive any key information of the result in RN from that in RL. The main
contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We formally define a secure outsourcing scheme and four outsourcing models. The proposed ExpSOS
is shown to be effective under all four different models.
• We develop schemes to securely outsource exponentiation operations in a general finite group,
including modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication on elliptic curves.
• We outsource exponential operation to one single untrusted server eliminating the non-collusion
assumption between multiple servers.
• Our proposed ExpSOS is efficient in that it requires only a small number of modular multiplications
at local side.
• We propose a verification scheme such that the end-user can verify the validity of the result with
probability approximately 1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce four secure outsourcing models
and formally define a secure outsourcing scheme. In Section III, we present the design of ExpSOS for
both modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication based on ring homomorphism. We propose the
verification scheme in Section IV. The complexity and security analysis of ExpSOS are given in Section
V. Then we apply ExpSOS to outsource several cryptographic protocols in Section VI. In Section VII,
we compare the performance of ExpSOS with several existing works and give some numeric results. We
conclude in Section VIII.
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4II. SECURE COMPUTATION OUTSOURCING MODEL
A. System Model and Threat Model
a) System Model: In the general settings of computation outsourcing, the system consists of two
entities: an end-user E and the cloud S. The end-user E is resource-constrained. It has limited com-
putational power and storage space. The cloud S is regarded as possessing abundant resources and is
able to carry out expensive computations. The cloud can be further modeled as the single-server model
and the multiple-servers model. In the single-server model, the cloud is viewed as one unit. In contrast,
in the multiple-servers model, the cloud is divided into two or more individual units. Each unit carries
out the computational tasks independently. While communication between different units is allowed, key
information is only limited to individual unit since otherwise security of the whole system maybe in
jeopardy.
Suppose the end-user E wishes to accomplish a computationally expensive task F (x)→ ω, where x
is the input and ω is the output of the task. However, due to the limited resources, E may not be able to
finish the task using the locally available resources. The computational task F could be outsourced to S.
Unfortunately, the cloud is only a shared server and cannot be fully trusted. Therefore, we have to make
sure that it is infeasible for S to derive any key information about both x and ω from the outsourced
task.
b) Threat Model: We propose two threat models for the cloud. First, the cloud S is honest but
curious. That is, the cloud will honestly fulfill its advertised functionality. However, S could be curious.
It may try to exploit any key information from the outsourced task, which may include the input, the
output as well as the intermediate computational results. When the outsourced data is sensitive, this could
cause severe security and privacy issues. Second, the cloud S is malicious, meaning that the cloud S
may not carry out the desired computation truthfully. This can happen for various reasons. A simple
scenario could be that the cloud simply returns some trivial results since the computational resource is
a commodity for the cloud server. As a consequence, the end-user E is unable to receive a valid result
from the cloud server S.
Based on the above system model and threat model, we can divide the computation outsourcing
scenarios into four types in a hierarchical manner:
• MS: Malicious cloud under Single-server model.
• HCS: Honest but Curious cloud under Single-server model.
• MM: Malicious cloud under Multiple-servers model.
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5• HCM: Honest but Curious cloud under Multiple-servers model.
It is hierarchical in the sense that a secure outsourcing scheme designed for single-server model can
be extended to multiple-servers model and a scheme for malicious cloud can be extended to honest but
curious cloud. Specifically, these four models can be organized into three layers: at the bottom layer
is the HCM model, in the middle are the MM and HCS and on the top is MS. A secure outsourcing
scheme designed for a model in an upper layer is also suitable for that in a lower layer . Thus, a secure
outsourcing scheme for MS is most widely applicable and achieves the highest security standard. In this
paper, we first propose a secure outsourcing scheme for the HCS model. Then a verification scheme is
proposed for MS model.
B. Definition of Secure Outsourcing Scheme
A secure computation outsourcing scheme mainly addresses two issues: the security of the outsourced
computational problem and the validity of the returned results. We formally define a Secure Outsourcing
Scheme (SOS) as a 4-tuple (T , C,R,V) consisting of four different functions:
1) Problem Transformation T : F (x) → G(y). The end-user E locally transforms the problem
F (x) to a new form G(y), where y is the new input and G is the new problem description. E
then outsources G(y) to the cloud server S.
2) Cloud Computation C : G(y) → (Ω,Γ). The cloud S solves the transformed problem G(y) to
obtain the corresponding result Ω. At the same time, S returns Γ that is a proof of the validity of
the result.
3) Result Recovery R : Ω → ω. Based on the returned result Ω, the end-user E recovers the result
ω of the original problem F (x).
4) Result Verification V : (Ω,Γ, ω) → ⊤ = {True,False}. Based on ω,Ω and the proof Γ, the
end-user E verifies the validity of the result.
An SOS should satisfy the following two requirements:
1) Soundness: given that the cloud is honest but curious, E can successfully recover the correct result
ω from the returned result Ω. That is R(Ω) = ω.
2) Security: the cloud is unable to derive any key information about the original input x and output
ω from the transformed problem G, the new input y and the new output Ω.
To measure the performance of an SOS, we adopt a similar definition of efficiency and verifiability as
proposed in [8]. We introduce the following two definitions:
February 29, 2016 DRAFT
6Definition 1 (α-efficient). Suppose the running time of a task F for E is t0. Under an SOS, the running
time of local processing for E is tp. Then the SOS is α-efficient if t0tp ≥ α.
Definition 2 (β-verifiable). Given the returned output Ω and the proof Γ, denote the probability that E
is able to verify the validity of the result ω as ρ. Then an SOS is β-verifiable if ρ ≥ β.
From the definition above, we can see that a larger α indicates a better performance of a secure
outsourcing scheme, while a larger β means a better verifiability.
III. SECURE OUTSOURCING OF EXPONENTIATION OPERATIONS
In this section, we first define a ring homomorphism f : R1 → R2. Based on this ring homomorphism,
we propose a secure outsourcing scheme for exponentiation operations. In this section, the threat model
is assumed to be HCS. However, our proposed verification scheme ensures that ExpSOS is secure under
the MS model.
A. Ring Homomorphism
Consider two rings and their corresponding operations (R1,+, ·) and (R2, ◦, ⋆) and a mapping function
f : R1 → R2. We define ring homomorphism as follows:
Definition 3 (Ring Homomorphism). Given (R1,+, ·) and (R2, ◦, ⋆), a mapping function f : R1 → R2
is a ring homomorphism if there exists an inverse mapping function g : R2 → R1 and the pair (f, g)
possesses the following two properties:
• Additive Homomorphism: ∀x1, x2 ∈ R1, x1 + x2 = g(f(x1) ◦ f(x2));
• Multiplicative Homomorphism: ∀x1, x2 ∈ R1, x1 · x2 = g(f(x1) ⋆ f(x2)).
In this paper, we assume that exponentiation operations are operated in the ring RN . We note that N is
not necessarily a prime. It can also be product of large primes. Then, our primitive goal is to construct a
proper ring homomorphism f : RN → RL that maps elements in RN to elements in another ring denoted
as RL. In this way, the computations in RN can be concealed when transformed to the corresponding
computations in RL so that the computations in RN can be concealed.
Define f : RN → RL as follows:
f(x) = (x+ kN) mod L, (1)
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7where k is a random integer in RN , L = pN and p is a large prime. The following theorem states that
the proposed f achieves ring homomorphism.
Theorem 1. ∀x ∈ RN , the mapping f defined in equation (1) is a ring homomorphism.
Proof: We show that there exists an inverse mapping function g : RL → RN and the pair (f, g)
possesses both the additive and the multiplicative homomorphic properties. Define the inverse mapping
function g as
g(y) = y mod N.
Suppose x1, x2 ∈ RN , f(x1) = (x1 + k1N) mod L and f(x2) = (x2 + k2N) mod L, where k1, k2 ∈
RN are randomly selected integers. We can verify that
g(f(x1) + f(x2))
= ((x1 + k1N) mod L+ (x2 + k2N) mod L) mod N
= (x1 + k1N + x2 + k2N) mod L mod N
= (x1 + k1N + x2 + k2N) mod N
= (x1 + x2) mod N.
.
Thus, we have proved that (f, g) has additive homomorphic property. Similarly, we can verify that
(f, g) is also multiplicative homomorphic as follows:
g(f(x1) · f(x2))
= ((x1 + k1N) mod L · (x2 + k2N) mod L) mod N
= ((x1 + k1N) · (x2 + k2N)) mod L mod N
= ((x1 + k1N) · (x2 + k2N)) mod N
= x1 · x2 mod N.
.
Hence, the proposed mapping function f(x) = (x+ kN) mod L is a ring homomorphism.
The above proposed ring homomorphism enables us to transform the addition and multiplication
in a ring into the corresponding operations in another large ring. We further explore the polynomial
homomorphic property of the ring homomorphism that is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Polynomial Homomorphism). Suppose x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ RnN and poly(x) is a
polynomial function defined on x. A mapping function f : RN −→ RL is polynomial homomorphic if
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8there exists an inverse mapping function g : RL −→ RN such that
g(poly(f(x))) = poly(x),
where f is applied on x opponent-wise.
Theorem 2. The proposed ring homomorphism f(x) = (x+ kN) mod L is polynomial-homomorphic.
The proof of the above theorem is straightforward given the additive and multiplicative homomorphic
properties of the ring homomorphism.
B. ExpSOS under HCS Model
In this section, we will consider two kinds of exponentiation operations, that are modular exponentiation
and scalar multiplication on elliptic curves.
1) Secure Outsourcing of Modular Exponentiation: Consider modular exponentiation R = ua mod N .
We assume that N is either a large prime or a product of large prime numbers, which is the typical
situation in cryptosystems. Theorem 1 states that the result of multiplication in the ring RN can be
obtained from the multiplication in RL through the transformation function and the inverse function. If
we take x1 = x2 = u, we can get
((u+ rN) mod L)2 mod N = u2 mod N.
If we repeat the multiplication in RN for a times, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For u, a, r ∈ RN , we have
((u+ rN) mod L)a mod N = ua mod N.
Corollary 1 gives us a way to conceal the base when outsourcing modular exponentiation. That is, we
can first transform the original base u to U = (u + rN) mod L, where r ∈ RN is a random integer.
Then the cloud can compute Ua mod L based on which the result can be recovered by computing
(Ua mod L) mod N = ua mod N . As long as N is kept secret, the cloud cannot learn the value of u
due to the randomness of r.
The remaining task is to conceal the exponent a. We have the following theorem.
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9Theorem 3. For N = p1p2 · · · pm, where p1, p2, · · · , pm are distinct prime numbers, we have
ua+kφ(N) mod N = ua mod N,
where k is a random integer and φ(·) is the Euler’s totient function.
Proof: We first prove u1+kφ(N) mod N = u mod N . Consider a prime factor pi of N , i =
1, 2, · · · ,m. There are two cases:
• Case 1: gcd(u, pi) 6= 1, that is u and pi are not relatively prime. In this case, we have pi | u. Thus
(u1+kφ(N) − u) mod pi = 0,
which means that pi | (u1+kφ(N) − u).
• Case 2: gcd(u, pi) = 1, that is u and pi are relatively prime. Then, by the Euler’s Theorem, we
have uφ(pi) mod pi = 1. From the multiplicative property of the Euler’s totient function, we have
φ(N) = φ(p1)φ(p2) · · · φ(pm). Let θ(pi) = φ(N)/φ(pi). Then,
u1+kφ(N) mod pi
= u · ukφ(p1)φ(p2)···φ(pm) mod pi
= u mod pi · (u
φ(pi) mod pi)
kθ(pi) mod pi
= u mod pi · (1)
kθ(pi) mod pi
= u mod pi.
That is (u1+kφ(N) − u) mod pi = 0.
Thus, in both cases, we have proved that pi | (u1+kφ(N) − u). Since pi is arbitrarily selected and
p1, p2, · · · , pm are distinct primes, we have
N | (u1+kφ(N) − u).
Hence, u1+kφ(N) mod N = u mod N . Multiplying both sides of the equation by ua−1, we can
obtain
ua+kφ(N) mod N = ua mod N.
In Theorem 3, we do not require that u and N to be co-prime as required in the Euler’s theorem.
Instead, we assume that N is the product of distinct primes that is typical in cryptosystems. For instance,
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in RSA, the modulus N = pq is the product of two distinct prime numbers.
Theorem 3 introduces a way to conceal the exponent a. That is, by transforming the original exponent
a to A = a + kφ(N), where k is a random integer, we can conceal a due to the randomness of k.
Now, based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, we can construct our secure outsourcing scheme for modular
exponentiation. In the secure outsourcing scheme, the function C(U,A,L) outsourced to the could can
be expressed as a modular exponentiation C(U,A,L) = UA mod L. The result recovery function is
R(R,N) = R mod N . The secure outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiation under HCS model is
given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secure Outsourcing of Modular Exponentiation Under HCS Model
Input: N,u, a ∈ RN .
Output: R = ua mod N .
Key Generation:
1: E generates a large prime p and calculate L← pN .
2: The public key is Kp = {L}, and the private key is Ks = {p,N}.
Problem Transformation T :
1: E selects random integers r, k ∈ RN as the temporary key.
2: E calculates A← a+ kφ(N), U ← (u+ rN) mod L.
3: E outsources C(U,A,L) to the cloud.
Cloud Computation C:
1: S computes R1 ← C(U,A,L) = UA mod L.
2: S returns R1 to E.
Result Recovery R:
1: E recovers the result as R←R(R1) = R1 mod N .
The soundness of the outsourcing scheme is guaranteed by the following theorem:
Theorem 4. The secure outsourcing scheme for modular exponentiation is sound. That is R = R1 mod
N = ua mod N .
The proof of Theorem 4 is straightforward based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 3. Specifically, by
transforming the original problem of modular exponentiation to a disguised form, our proposed ExpSOS
under HCS model is sound.
2) Secure Outsourcing of Scalar Multiplication: In this section, we consider secure outsourcing of
scalar multiplication sP on an elliptic curve E(Fp) described by the following short Weierstrass equation:
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E : y2 = x3 + bx+ c, (2)
where the coefficients b, c and the coordinates of the points are all in a finite field Fp. Furthermore, for
cryptographic applications, we usually work with points in a set of m-torsion points E(Fp)[m] defined as
E(Fp)[m] = {P ∈ E(Fp) : [m]P = O}, where O is the point at infinity. Thus, we assume P ∈ E(Fp)[m]
and s ∈ Zm.
The secure outsourcing of scalar multiplication relies on two basic operations that are point addition
and point doubling. They play a similar role as modular multiplication in the outsourcing of modular
exponentiation. Specifically, the “double-and-add” algorithm to calculate scalar multiplication on elliptic
curves consists of a series of point addition and point doubling. Thus intuitively, we can regard secure
outsourcing of point addition and point doubling as two building blocks to implement scalar multiplication.
We utilize projective coordinate to represent a point P = (x, y, z) corresponding to the point Q =(
x
z ,
y
z
)
in the affine coordinates. As a result, the computation of point addition and point doubling
consists of only modular addition and multiplication. Specifically, given two points P = (x1, y1, z1) and
Q = (x2,y2, z2) such that P 6= ±Q, the point addition P +Q = (x3, y3, z3) can be calculated as follows:
x3 = BC, y3 = A(B
2x1z2 − C)−B
3y1z2, z3 = B
3z1z2,
where
A = y2z1 − y1z2, B = x2z1 − x1z2,
C = A2z1z2 −B
3 − 2B2x1z2.
The point doubling 2P = (x4, y4, z4) can be calculated as follows:
x4 = 2BD, y4 = A(4C −D)− 8y
2
1B
2, z4 = 8B
3,
where
A = bz21 + 3x
2
1, B = y1z1, C = x1y1B,D = A
2 − 8C.
In projective coordinates, one point addition and doubling take 14 multiplications and 12 multiplications,
respectively.
Theorem 2 states that by mapping the variables of a polynomial from a finite field to variables in
a ring, we can evaluate the polynomial in the ring and recover the result in the finite field. This gives
us the insight of our proposed scheme since essentially, point addition and point doubling are both the
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process of evaluating polynomials on the coordinates of the points. Thus, we can construct the secure
computation scheme for point addition and point doubling as in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Secure Point Addition and Point Doubling
Input: P = (x1, y1, z1), Q = (x2, y2, z2) and E = {b, c, p}.
Output: point R = P +Q = (x3, y3, z3).
1: Select a large prime p and compute N = pq.
2: For a coordinate xi, select a random integer ki and compute x′i = (xi + kip) mod N .
3: Transform the points P,Q and the elliptic curve E to P ′ = (x′1, y′1, z′1), Q′ = (x′2, y′2, z′2) and
E′ = {b′, c′, N} respectively as described in Step 2.
4: Outsource P ′, Q′ and E′ to the cloud.
5: Cloud computes R′ = P ′ +Q′ following the point doubling or point addition prodecure.
6: On receiving R′ = (x′3, y′3, z′3), recover R as R = (x′3, y′3, z′3) mod p = (x3, y3, z3).
Theorem 5. The proposed secure point addition and point doubling algorithm is sound.
The proof of Theorem 5 is straightforward from the polynomial-homomorphic property of the ring
homomorphism.
The above theorem enables us to conceal the points as well as the parameters of the elliptic curve
from the cloud. To outsource scalar multiplication sP , the remaining part is to conceal the multiplier
s. We utilize the property of the order m of the torsion group that is rmP = O, for an arbitrary point
P ∈ E[m](Fp) and any integer r. As a result, we can conceal s by adding it to a multiple of m as
s′ = s + rm, where r is a random integer. Now, we can summarize the secure outsourcing scheme of
scalar multiplication as in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 6. The secure outsourcing scheme for scalar multiplication is sound. That is R = sP .
Proof: From Theorem 5, we know that the secure computation scheme for point addition and point
doubling is sound. Since the double-and-add algorithm to compute scalar multiplication consists of a series
of point addition and point doubling, we have R = s′P = (s+ rm)P = sP + rmP = sP +O = sP .
In the next section, we propose a verification scheme to ensure that ExpSOS is secure under the MS
model.
IV. RESULT VERIFICATION
In this section, we first analyze the necessary properties of a result verification scheme through
some counter examples. We then propose a result verification scheme for the outsourcing of modular
February 29, 2016 DRAFT
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Algorithm 3 Secure Outsourcing of Scalar Multiplication Under HCS Model
Input: P = (x1, y1, z1), s, E = {b, c, p} and m.
Output: point R = sP .
Key Generation:
1: End-user selects a large prime q and compute N ← pq.
Problem Transformation:
1: End-user generates random integers k1, k2, k3, k4, k6, r.
2: Computes x′1 ← (x1 + k1p) mod N , y′1 ← (y1 + k2p) mod N , z′1 ← (z1 + k3p) mod N , b′ ←
(b+ k4p) mod N , c
′ ← (c+ k6p) mod N , s
′ ← s+ rm.
3: End-user outsources P ′ = (x′1, y′1, z′1), E′ = {b′, c′, N} and s′.
Cloud Computation:
1: The cloud computes R′ ← s′P ′ utilizing the double-and-add algorithm.
Result Recovery:
1: The end-user recovers the result R as R← (x′3, y′3, z′3) mod p.
exponentiation under MS model. We show that the verification scheme can also be applied to the
outsourcing of scalar multiplication.
In the HCS model discussed in the previous section, we assume that the cloud will honestly conduct
its advertised functionality. That is, to compute the function C(U,A,L) and return the correct result
UA mod L. However, in the MS model, the cloud may manipulate the result in order to save computational
resources. Thus, to verify the soundness of the result returned by the cloud is a critical issue.
A natural way to verify the result, as utilized in many previous works [5], [8], [9], is to outsource
the problem multiple times and verify whether the returned results satisfy certain criteria. However,
this methodology may cause potential security problems if it is not carefully designed. This is because
outsourcing multiple times essentially gives more information about the original problem to the cloud,
which may increase the probability for the cloud to recover the original problem. Moreover, the cloud
may manipulate the results in order to satisfy the criteria, thus passing the verification. Therefore, we
believe that an effective verification scheme should at least have the following two properties:
• Security: The verification process should not reveal any key information about the original problem
to the cloud.
• Anti-manipulation: It is infeasible for the cloud to manipulate the result and pass the verification
process.
We utilize two counter-examples in verifying modular exponentiation to illustrate the significance of the
above properties and emphasize the key issues in designing a verification scheme.
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Counter-Example 1. Transform the exponent a to A1 = a+ k1φ(N) and A2 = a+ k2φ(N). The cloud
returns results R1 = UA1 mod L and R2 = UA2 mod L. The end-user checks whether the condition
R1 mod N = R2 mod N holds.
Unfortunately, the above example violates the security property. When the cloud possesses A1 and A2,
it can calculate A1 − A2 = (k1 − k2)φ(N), which is a multiple of the Euler’s totient function φ(N).
In this case, the cloud can factorize (k1 − k2)φ(N) based on which, the cloud may be able to check
the primality of N . Since N is a product of large primes, the consequence is that the cloud can limit
the valid value of N to a short list. That is the cloud have a good chance to guess the value of N .
This means that the cloud can derive some key information from the outsourced problem thus making
outsourcing insecure. Similarly, some variances of this type of method (e.g., A1 = a + k1φ(N) and
A2 = ca+ k2φ(N), where c is a known constant) may also have security problems.
Counter-Example 2. Transform the exponent a to A1 = a+ k1φ(N) and A2 = a+ t+ k2φ(N), where
t is a relatively small integer and calculating ut mod N is within the end-user’s computational ability.
The cloud returns results R1 = UA1 mod L and R2 = UA2 mod L. The end-user checks whether the
condition (R1 · ut) mod N = R2 mod N holds.
Due to the randomness of t, the cloud is not able to obtain a multiple of φ(N). However, from the
equality condition (R1 · ut) mod N = R2 mod N , we have UA1 · ut mod N = UA2 mod N , which is
equivalent to
ut mod N = UA2−A1 mod N.
In this case, the cloud can manipulate two arbitrary integers A′1 and A′2 as long as A′2−A′1 = A2−A1.
The results will pass the verification but the recovered result R = UA′1 mod N is incorrect. This means
that the cloud can manipulate a false result while passing the verification process.
From the above two counter examples, we can see that security and anti-manipulation are two critical
issues in result verification schemes. In the following Algorithm 4, we propose a verification scheme for
modular exponentiation.
Now, we utilize an example to illustrate our proposed ExpSOS under MS model.
Example 1. Suppose the end-user E wants to calculate ua mod N , where N = 431 is a prime, u = 189
and a = 346. E can outsource ua mod N as follow:
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Algorithm 4 ExpSOS under MS Model
Input: N,u, a ∈ RN .
Output: R0 = ua mod N , Λ = {True,False}.
Key Generation:
1: E generates a large prime p and calculate L← pN .
2: The public key is Kp = {L}, and the private key is Ks = {p,N}.
Problem Transformation T :
1: E selects random integers r, k1, k2, t1, t2 as the ephemeral key with the constraint that t1, t2 ≤ b.
2: E calculates A1 ← a+ k1φ(N), A2 ← t1a+ t2 + k2φ(N) and U ← (u+ rN) mod L.
3: E outsources C(U,A1, L) and C(U,A2, L) to the cloud.
Cloud Computation C:
1: S computes R1 ← C(U,A1, L)← UA1 mod L and R2 ← C(U,A2, L)← UA2 mod L.
2: S returns R1 and R2 to E.
Result Verification V:
1: E checks (R1 mod N)t1 · ut2 mod N = R2 mod N .
2: If the equality holds, set Λ← True. Otherwise, set Λ← False.
Result Recovery R:
1: E recovers the result as R0 ←R(R1) = R1 mod N .
1) Key Generation: E select a prime number p = 397 and calculate L = pN = 171107. Then E
selects random integers r = 146, k1 = 332, k2 = 68 and t1 = 4, t2 = 12 with t1, t2 < b = 16.
2) Problem Transformation: E calculates A1 = a + k1φ(N) = 143106, A2 = t1a+ t2 + k2φ(N) =
30636 and U = (u + rN) mod L = 63115. E then queries C(U,A1, L) and C(U,A2, L) to the
cloud S.
3) Cloud computation: S computes R1 = UA1 mod L = 63115143106 mod 171107 = 81281, R2 =
UA2 mod L = 6311530636 mod 171107 = 55473 and returns R1 and R2 to E.
4) Result Verification: E calculates (R1 mod N)t1 ·ut2 mod N = (1904 · 18912) mod 431 = 305 and
R2 mod N = 55473 mod 431 = 305 that satisfy (R1 mod N)t1 · ut2 mod N = R2 mod N . Thus
the returned results are correct.
5) Result Recovery: E recovers the result as R = R1 mod N = 81281 mod 431 = 190 that is equal
to ua mod N = 190.
In Algorithm 4, the two outsourced exponential operations are related through an affine function. As a
consequence, the cloud is unable to derive a multiple of φ(N) only based on A1 and A2. Moreover, the
cloud cannot manipulate the results to create a verifiable equality.
This verification scheme can also be applied to the outsourcing of scalar multiplications. The base
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point P can be transformed to P ′ as described in Algorithm 3. The exponent s can be transformed to
s1 = s+ r1m and s2 = t1s+ t2 + r2m, where r1, r2, t1, t2 are random integers and t1, t2 ≤ b. Then the
end-user can check the condition Q2 = t1Q1 + t2P , where Q1 = s1P ′ and Q2 = s2P ′.
V. COMPLEXITY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security and the computational complexity of ExpSOS. We utilize the
secure outsourcing of modular exponentiation as a representative to perform the analysis. The analysis
of outsourcing scalar multiplication can be conducted in a similar way. We show that ExpSOS is secure
under both HCS and MS model. Specifically, under the HCS model, the ExpSOS is 12 log2 a-efficient.
Under the MS model, the ExpSOS is 12 logb a-efficient and (1−
1
2b2 )-verifiable, where a is the exponent
and b is the security parameter.
A. Security Analysis
In ExpSOS, we conceal the base u through a ring homomorphism (u+ rN) mod L and the exponent
a is mapped to a+ kφ(N). In our analysis, we show that given the public information {L,U,A1, A2},
the cloud cannot derive any key information about the input {u, a, p} and the output R = ua mod p.
First, the following theorem shows that the ring homomorphism is secure.
Theorem 7. When the integers N and p are sufficiently large, it is computationally infeasible to recover
u from the ring homomorphism f : u 7→ U = (u+ rN) mod L.
Proof: The security is based on the hardness of integer factorization. That is, given L = pN , where
p and N are large prime numbers, it is computationally infeasible to factorize L to get p and N . In our
case, we consider the module N as a large prime number or a product of large prime numbers, which is
typical in cryptosystems. Thus, given L, the cloud is unable to recover N . Furthermore, as r is a random
integer, given U = (u+ rN) mod L, the cloud is also unable to recover u.
Theorem 8. In the ExpSOS scheme, it is computationally infeasible to recover the exponent a under
both HCS and MS model.
Proof: The proof is straightforward since under the HCS model, the cloud obtains A = a+ kφ(N),
while under the MS model, the cloud obtains A1 = a+ k1φ(N) and A2 = t1a+ t2 + k2φ(N). In both
cases, the randomness of k, k1, k2, t1, t2 and security of the totient function φ(N) make it infeasible for
the cloud server to derive the exponent a.
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We show that the proposed verification scheme has the security and effectiveness properties as described
previously. First, the security is based on the likelihood of finding two integers R1 and R2 so that
(R1 mod N)
t1 · ut2 mod N = R2 mod N holds true, and deriving a multiple of φ(N) from A1 =
a + k1φ(N), and A2 = t1a + t2 + k2φ(N). The former would enable the cloud server to cheat the
end-user without conducting the actual computation and the latter could make it possible for the cloud
server to recover φ(N) and then perform collision attacks.
Theorem 9. For any two randomly selected integers R1 and R2, the probability that (R1 mod N)t1 ·
ut2 mod N = R2 mod N is 1/b2.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is straightforward since only one pair of (t1, t2) will make the
equality holds true, while the total number of possible combinations for the (t1, t2) pair is b2.
This theorem indicates that if the cloud wants to manipulate the result, it has to guess the random
integers, the probability to succeed is only 1/b2. In fact, if we outsource C(U,A1, L) and C(U,A2, L)
in a random order, we can further reduce the probability for the cloud to guess the correct randoms to
1/(2b2). According to Definition 2, ExpSOS is at least (1− 1/(2b2))-verifiable.
Theorem 10. For any two randomly selected integer t1 and t2, the probability to derive a multiple of
φ(N) is at most 1/b2.
Proof: Since A1 = a+ k1φ(N) and A2 = t1a+ t2 + k2φ(N), and t1 is a randomly chosen integer
from (0, b], the cloud server has probability 1/b to get the right t1 and derive the following equation
(t1k1 − k2)φ(N) = (t1A1 −A2) + t2, (3)
where A1 and A2 are known and t1, t2 are secretly selected. For the right-hand side of this equation, if
further t2 is known, then its integer factorization could potentially reveal the factors of φ(N). However,
since t2 is randomly chosen in the range (0, b], the likelihood to get a proper t2 is 1/b. Therefore, the
overall probability to obtain equation (3) is 1/b2.
The upper bound b is a security parameter that measures the confidence of the end-user about the
returned result. In practical computation outsourcing systems, the cloud would be severely punished if
cloud manipulation is detected. Therefore, the benefit for the cloud to cheat would be hardly justifiable
in this setting.
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B. Complexity Analysis
We utilize outsourcing of modular exponentiation as a representative to analysis complexity. The
analysis can be applied to scalar multiplication similarly. The essence of ExpSOS is to limit the number
of modular multiplications for the end-user to compute modular exponentiation with the aid of the cloud.
In our analysis, we utilize the number of modular multiplications, denoted as π, as a measurement. To
calculate ua mod N , the number of multiplications is π = 32 la, where la is the bit length of a [11].
Therefore, in calculating the modular exponentiation ua mod N , la ≈ log2 a and π ≈ 32 log2 a.
In ExpSOS, under the HCS model, to calculate U,A and L, the end-user needs 3 multiplications. We
notice that when the end-user knows the factors of N , it is computationally easy to calculate φ(N).
For example, when N is a prime, φ(N) = N − 1. Moreover, the calculation of φ(N) is a one-time
process. The computational overhead for calculating φ(N) is negligible especially when the end-user
outsources modular exponentiation multiple times. Thus, under HCS model, we have πHCS = 3. Hence,
the computational gain from outsourcing is αHCS = π/πHCS = 12 log2 a. From Definition 1, ExpSOS is
1
2 log2 a-efficient under the HCS model.
Under the MS model, the calculation of L,U,A1, A2 will take 4 multiplications. In the verification
scheme, the end-user has to calculate (R1 mod N)t1 mod N and ut2 mod N . Thus, πMS = 4+ 32 log2 t1+
3
2 log2 t2 + 1. Since t1 and t2 are upper-bounded by b, we have log2 t1 + log2 t2 ≤ 2 log2 b. Hence the
computational gain from outsourcing is
α =
π
πMS
=
3
2 log2 a
5 + 32 log2 t1 +
3
2 log2 t2
≥
3
2 log2 a
5 + 3 log2 b
≈
1
2
logb a.
Thus under the MS model, ExpSOS is at least 12 logb a-efficient.
C. Trade-Off between Computation and Security
The above security and complexity analysis reveal the trade-off between computational overhead and
security. In the MS model, ExpSOS is at least 12 logb a-efficient and (1 − 1/(2b
2))-verifiable. Both
measurements relate to the same parameter b. On one hand, b is the upper bound of the computational
overhead that the end-user can tolerate. On the other hand, b reveals the confidence of the end-user
about the returned result which is also regarded as the security level of the result. When b increases, the
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end-user has to carry out more computation. However, the probability that the end-user can verify the
validity of the result also increases.
Thus, the proposed ExpSOS is cost-aware in the sense that it enables the end-user to have the flexibility
to choose the most suitable outsourcing scheme according to its computational constraint and security
demand. This is important especially when the end-users vary in computational power and security
demands. It also makes ExpSOS widely applicable.
VI. APPLICATIONS
The proposed ExpSOS is able to conceal the base, the exponent and the module of the modular
exponentiation ua mod N . It can also be used to conceal the base point P and multiplier s of the scalar
multiplication sP . With this feature, the parameters (private or public) within the cryptosystem are totally
concealed from the outside especially the cloud. Thus, the cryptosystem is isolated from the outsourced
system. In this sense, ExpSOS can be regarded as a black box that takes as input {u, a,N, b} and creates
the output ua mod N as ExpSOS(u, a,N, b) → ua mod N , where b is security parameter selected by
the end-user. The end-user will have a performance gain of 12 logb a and can verify the validity of the
result with probability 1− 12b2 .
In this section, we will explore efficient outsourcing of exponential operations in some typical cryp-
tographic protocols to the cloud. We will first introduce the outsourcing of Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) that involves only modular exponentiation. Then, we illustrate how to outsource the encryption
part of Identity Based Encryption (IBE) system involving both modular exponentiation and scalar mul-
tiplication.
A. Outsourcing DSA Operations
We utilize DSA [12] as an example of digital signature schemes. In DSA, the global public key
component {p, q, g} is shared by a group of users. Here, p, q are prime numbers and q is a divisor of
p − 1. g = h(p−1)/q mod p with 1 < h < (p − 1) such that h(p−1)/q mod p > 1. The algorithm can be
divided into the following three phases:
1) Key Generation: The signer E generates a private key x with 0 < x < q and calculates the public
key as y = gx mod p.
2) Signing: E selects a private key k with 0 < k < q and calculates r = (gk mod p) mod q,
s = (k−1(h(M) + xr)) mod q, where M is the message and h(M) is the hash value of M using
SHA-1. The signature of M is {r, s}.
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3) Verifying: A verifier V calculates ω = s−1 mod q, u1 = (h(M)ω) mod q, u2 = rw mod q and
v = (gu1yu2) mod p mod q. Then the verifier checks whether v = r is true.
Algorithm 5 Secure Outsourcing of DSA message signing
Key Generation:
1: E selects a large prime number Q and calculate L← Qp.
Problem Transformation T :
1: E selects temporary key r1, k1, k2, k3, t1, t2, t3 with t1, t2, t3 < b.
2: E calculates X ← x + k1φ(p), K ← k + k2φ(p), XK ← t1x + t2k + t3 + k3φ(p) and G ←
(g + r1p) mod L.
3: E outsources C(X,G,L), C(K,G,L) and C(XK , G, L) in random order to the cloud S.
Cloud Computation C:
1: S computes R1 ← GX mod L, R2 ← GK mod L and R3 ← GXK mod L.
2: S returns the results R1, R2 and R3 to E.
Result Verification V:
1: E verifies the results by checking ((R1 mod p)t1 · (R2 mod p)t2 · gt3 mod p) mod p = R3 mod p.
Result Recovery R:
1: E recovers the results y ← R1 mod p and r ← (R2 mod p) mod q.
Signature Generation:
1: E generates the signature {r, s} by calculating s← (k−1(h(M) + xr)) mod q.
2: E shares the public information {G,R1, L} within the group of users.
We can see that the computational bottleneck of DSA is the calculation of gx mod p, gk mod p for the
signer and (gu1yu2) mod p for the verifier. We formulate the outsourcing of DSA in Algorithms 5 and
Algorithm 6. To outsource the two exponentiation operations gx mod p, gk mod p, the signer S makes
3 queries to the cloud and carries out πE = (8 + 92 log b) modular multiplications. In comparison, the
original computational burden is π0 = 32(log x+ log k). For the verifier V , the computational overhead
becomes πV = (6 + 6 log b) in comparison with the original π0 = 32 (log u1 + log u2).
B. Outsourcing Identity Based Encryption
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) system is proposed to alleviate the process of public key certification
in traditional public key cryptosystems. In IBE system, a user can utilize his identity such as his email
address as the public key. Then a trusted authority will generate and distribute private key to the message
receiver. The idea of IBE was initialized by Shamir in [13]. A practical IBE system was proposed in
[14] based on bilinear pairing on elliptic curves.
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Algorithm 6 Secure Outsourcing of DSA sigature verification
Problem Transformation T :
1: The verifier V generates temporary key k4, k5, k6, k7, t4, t5, t6, t7 with t4, t5, t6, t7 < b.
2: V calculates U1 ← u1 + k4φ(p), U2 ← u2 + k5φ(p), U3 ← t4u1 + t5 + k6φ(p) and U4 ← t6u2 +
t7 + k7φ(p).
3: V outsources C(G,U1, L), C(G,U2, L), C(R1, U3, L) and C(R1, U4, L) to the cloud.
Cloud Computation C:
1: S calculates R4 ← GU1 mod L, R5 ← GU2 mod L, R6 ← RU31 mod L, R7 ← R
U4
1 mod L
2: S returns the results {R4, R5, R6, R7} to V .
Result Verification V:
1: V verifies the results by checking ((R4 mod p)t4 · gt5 mod p) mod p = R6 mod p and ((R5 mod
p)t6 · (R1 mod p)
t7) mod p = R7 mod p.
Result Recovery R:
1: V recovers the results gu1 mod p← R4 mod p and yu2 mod p← R6 mod p.
Signature Verification:
1: V calculates v ← (gu1yu2) mod p and check v = r.
In an implementation of IBE system [15, Chapter 5], the public parameters are an elliptic curve
E(Fp)[m] and a base point P ∈ E(Fp)[m]. Also, the trusted authority will publish his own public key
PT ∈ E(Fp)[m]. The parameters are known to the authenticated users in the system. We assume that a
user Alice uses the hash of her own identity to generate the public key which is a point on the elliptic
curve, that is PA ∈ E(Fp)[m]. For any other user Bob who desires to send a message M to Alice, he
will conduct the following encryption process:
1) Bob selects a random integer r ∈ Zm;
2) Bob computes C1 = rP ;
3) Bob computes C2 = M ⊕ H(e(PA, PT ))r;
4) Bob sets the cipher text as C = (C1, C2).
In the above encryption algorithm, e(PA, PT ) denotes the pairing between public points PA and PT
and H(·) is a hash . We note that both the input and output of the pairing e(PA, PT ) are public. Thus,
the end-user Bob can obtain the pairing result denoted as g = e(PA, PT ). To this end, we can see that
the computational burden for Bob lies in the scalar multiplication rP and the modular exponentiation
gr mod p. We summarize the outsourcing of IBE as in Algorithm 7.
From the above two applications, we can summarize some techniques in designing secure outsourcing
scheme utilizing the outsourcing of exponential operation as a building block.
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Algorithm 7 Secure Outsourcing of Identity Based Encryption
Input: P = (x, y, z), r, g = e(PA, PT )
Output: C1 = rP , C2 = H(g)
r
Key Generation:
1: Bob selects a large prime q and calculates L← pq.
Problem Transformation T :
1: Bob generates temporary key k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, t1, t2 with t1, t2 < b.
2: Bob calculates r1 ← (r + k1p) mod L, r2 ← (t1r + t2 + k2p) mod L, x′ ← (x + k3p) mod L,
y′ ← (y + k4p) mod L, z
′ ← (z + k5p) mod L. Bob sets P ′ ← (x′, y′, z′).
3: Bob outsources C(r1, P ′, E′), C(r2, P ′, E′), C(r1,H(g), L) and C(r2,H(g), L) to the cloud, where
E′ is the transformed elliptic curve.
Cloud Computation C:
1: S calculates Q1 ← r1P ′, Q2 ← r2P ′, R1 ← H(g)r1 and R2 ← H(g)r2 .
2: S returns the results {Q1, Q2, R1, R2} to Bob.
Result Verification V:
1: Bob verifies the results by checking ((R1 mod p)t1 ·H(g)t2 mod p) mod p = R2 mod p and (t1Q1+
t2P ) mod p = Q2 mod p, where the modular is applied coordinate-wise.
Result Recovery R:
1: Bob recovers the results C1 ← Q2 mod p and C2 ←M ⊕R2 mod p.
• It is more efficient and secure to share some common parameters in different subroutines of the
outsourcing process. For example, in outsourcing of DSA, the signer and verifier share the same
disguised base G and R1. The benefits are that on one hand, the computational overhead is reduced;
on the other hand, less information is exposed to the cloud.
• When outsourcing modular exponentiation with the same base, the computational overhead can be
reduced by jointly verifying the result. For example, in outsourcing of of the DSA, the results
of gx mod p and gk mod p can be jointly verified by constructing a common exponent XK =
t1x + t2k + t3 + k3φ(p) that is a linear combination of the two disguised exponents X and K.
Therefore, the signer does not have to carry out the extra exponentiation.
• When making multiple queries to the cloud, the end-user can randomize the order of queries to
increase verifiability. For example, in outsourcing of DSA, the signer and the verifier need to make
3 and 4 queries to the cloud, respectively. If the order of queries are randomized, the cloud has to
guess the correct orders before guessing the correct parameters. As a result, the verifiability for the
signing process increases to 1− 16b3 and that of the verifying process increases to 1−
1
24b4 .
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Table I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Scheme Model Pre-Processing Multiplication Inversion Queries to Server verifiability
[8] MM 6 Rand 6 O(Rand) + 9 5 8 1/2
[9] MM 5 Rand 5 O(Rand) + 7 3 6 2/3
[10] MS 7 Rand 7 O(Rand) + 32 log χ+ 12 4 4 1/2
ExpSOS
HCS Not Required 3 0 1 Not Applicable
MM Not Required 3 0 2 1
MS Not Required 5 + 3 log b 0 2 1− 1/2b2 ≈ 1
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To the best of our knowledge, previous research on secure outsourcing of cryptographic computations
mainly focuses on modular exponentiation. In this section, we first compare ExpSOS with three existing
works on secure outsourcing of modular exponentiation. Then we give some numeric results to show the
efficiency of ExpSOS.
A. Performance Comparison
Secure outsourcing of cryptographic computations, especially modular exponentiation, has been a
popular research topic [8]–[10], [16]–[20]. For instance, the authors in [20] proposed a secure outsourcing
scheme for modular exponentiation with variable-exponent fixed base and fixed-exponent variable-base
under single untrusted server model. However, the base is known to the server. In [8], the authors
considered outsourcing variable-base variable-exponent modular exponentiation to two untrusted servers.
Following this work, the authors in [9] improved the scheme in [8] in both efficiency and verifiability.
Then, the authors in [10] made further improvement by reducing the two servers model to one single
untrusted server model. In the following, we will compare our ExpSOS with the three schemes in [8]–[10].
In both [8] and [9], the authors consider outsourcing modular exponentiation to two untrusted servers
S1 and S2 and it is assumed that the two servers do not collude which corresponds to our MM model. In
both schemes, a subroutine Rand is utilized to generate random modular exponentiation pairs. Specifically,
on input a base g ∈ Z∗p, the subroutine Rand will generate random pairs in the form of (θ, gθ mod p),
where θ is a random number in Z∗p. Then the end-user can make queries to Rand and each query will
return a random pair to the end-user. Typically, the subroutine Rand is implemented via two different
methods. One method is that a table of random pairs is pre-computed from a trusted server and stored
at the end-user. Whenever the end-user needs to make a query to Rand, it just randomly draw a pair
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from the table. The critical problem of this method is that it will take a lot of storage space from the
end-user. Specifically, a random pair will take 2lp space, where lp is the bit length of p. In addition, to
make the generation of the pairs look random, the table size should be large. As a result, the storage
overhead becomes unacceptable for the resource-constrained end-users. The other method is to utilize
some pre-processing techniques such as the BPV generator [18] and the the EBPV generator [19]. To
generate one random pair, the EBPV generator takes O(log2 la) modular multiplications, where la is the
bit length of the exponent.
The scheme proposed in [8] can be briefly summarized as follows. First, the end-user runs Rand 6 times
to obtain random pairs (α, gα), (β, gβ), (t1, gt1), (t2, gt2), (r1, gr1), (r2, gr2). Then uα can be written as
ua = vbfa−b
(
v
f
)
a−b
(u
v
)
d
(u
v
)
a−d,
where v = gα, b = βα , f and d are random integers. The end-user then makes queries in random order to
the cloud server S1 Q11 =
(
u
v
)
d, Q21 = f
a−b, Q31 = (g
r1)
t1
r1 , Q41 = (g
r2)
t2
r2 . Similarly, the end-user makes
queries to the second cloud server S2 Q12 =
(
u
v
)
a−d, Q22 =
(
v
f
)
a−b, Q32 = (g
r1)
t1
r1 , Q42 = (g
r2)
t2
r2
. The
result can be recovered as ua = gβ ·Q11 ·Q21 ·Q12 ·Q22. The result verification is carried out by checking
whether Q31 = Q32 = gt1 and Q41 = Q42 = gt2 . We note that the end-user needs to make queries to
each server S1 and S2 for four times, among which the first two are computation queries and the other
two are test queries. Since the test queries and the computation queries are independent, the servers can
potentially compute the test queries honestly but cheat in the computation queries. The authors address
this problem by sending out the queries in random order. The verifiability of this scheme is 12 . In the
outsourcing process, E has to run the subroutine Rand 6 times, make 9 modular multiplications (MMul)
and 5 modular inversions (MInv), where Rand has a complexity of O(log2 n) MMul and n is the bit
length of the exponent.
Based on [8], the authors in [9] made some improvement by reducing the computational overhead to 5
Rand, 7 MMul and 3MInv and the queries to the two servers are reduced to 6 times in total. Moreover,
the verifiability is improved to 23 .
In comparison, our ExpSOS under MM model can be modified as in Algorithm 8. Since the cloud
servers S1 and S2 do not collude, the only way to make the equality condition satisfied is that S1
and S2 both compute honestly. Thus the verifiability is 1. Moreover, in this process, we successfully
avoid inversion that is considered much more expensive than multiplication in field operations. The total
computational overhead is only 3 MMul.
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Table II
NUMERIC RESULTS
lN (bits)
lb(bits)
4 8 12 16
t0 (ms) ts (ms) τ ts (ms) τ ts (ms) τ ts (ms) τ
128 1358 87 15.6 216 6.3 321 4.2 397 3.4
256 2554 89 28.6 244 10.5 346 7.4 459 5.6
384 4095 127 32.3 249 16.5 358 11.4 463 8.8
512 7837 134 58.6 281 27.9 399 19.6 496 15.8
640 10991 146 75.0 288 38.2 423 26.0 627 17.5
768 11427 148 77.2 295 38.7 433 26.4 642 17.8
896 17445 158 110.2 317 54.9 451 38.7 680 25.6
1024 20235 174 116.2 329 61.5 504 40.1 739 27.4
Algorithm 8 ExpSOS under MM Model
Input: N,u, a ∈ RN .
Output: R0 = ua mod N , Λ = {True,False}.
Key Generation:
1: E generates a large prime number p and calculate L ← pN . The public key is Kp = {L} and the
private key is Ks = {p,N}.
2: E selects random integers r, k ∈ ZN as the temporary key.
Problem Transformation
1: E calculates A← a+ kφ(N) and U ← (u+ rN) mod L.
2: E then outsources {U,A,L} to both cloud servers S1 and S2.
CloudComputation:
1: S1 computes R1 ← UA mod L and S2 computes R2 ← UA mod L.
2: The results R1 and R2 are returned to E.
Result Verification
1: E checks R1 mod N = R2 mod N . Set Λ← True if the equality holds; otherwise set Λ← False.
Result Recovery:
1: E recovers the result as R← R1 mod N .
In [10], the authors assume a Malicious Single server (MS) model. Similarly, the scheme utilizes a
subroutine Rand via some pre-processing techniques such as BPV+ that is a modified version of BPV.
The scheme in [10] can be summarized as follows. First, the end-user runs Rand 7 times to obtain
random pairs (α1, gα1), (α2, gα2), (α3, gα3), (α4, gα4), (t1, gt1), (t2, gt2), (t3, gt3). Then it calculates c =
(a − bχ) mod p, ω = u/µ1, h = u/µ3, and θ = (α1b − α2)χ + (α3c − α4) mod p, where χ, b are
randomly selected and µi = gαi , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The end-user then queries to a single cloud server S
Q1 =
(
gt1
) θ
t1 , Q2 =
(
gt2
) t3−θ
t2 , Q3 = ωb, Q4 = hc. The result is recovered as ua = (µ2 ·Q3)χ ·Q1 ·µ4 ·Q4.
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The result verification is carried out by checking whether Q1 ·Q2 = gt3 is true. Similarly, the queries can
be divided as test queries and computation queries. As a consequence, the cloud can compute honestly
on the test queries and cheat on the computation queries. Thus, due to the random order of the queries,
the verifiability of this scheme is 12 . We note that in the result recovery process, the end-user has to
compute an exponentiation (µ2 · ωb)χ which takes 32 logχ multiplications. The whole scheme will take
7 Rand, 12 + 32 log χ MMul, 4 MInv and make 4 queries to the cloud server. In comparison, ExpSOS
can avoid inversion and only needs (5 + 3 log b) MMul, where b is a small integer.
In terms of security, we have shown that ExpSOS can successfully conceal the base, exponent and the
modulus of the modular exponentiation. It is computationally infeasible for the cloud to derive any key
information from the disguised problem. In comparison, all the above three schemes [8]–[10] can only
conceal the exponent and base while the modulus is exposed to the cloud. Thus ExpSOS can provide
much improved security. Moreover, the three schemes in [8], [9] and [10] achieve verifiability of 12 , 23
and 12 respectively. In comparison, the verifiability of ExpSOS is 1−
1
2b2 that is close to 1. This means
that the end-user is more confident about the results returned by the cloud. Furthermore, the security
of the schemes in [8] and [9] relies on the assumption that the two cloud servers will not collude. The
scheme [10] and our proposed ExpSOS are applicable to one single untrusted server hence eliminating
the non-collusion assumption.
The comparison of ExpSOS and the schemes in [8]–[10] is summarized in Table I. We can see that our
proposed ExpSOS outperforms other schemes in both computational complexity and security. ExpSOS
also makes the least queries to the cloud that will introduce the least communication overhead. Moreover,
ExpSOS is cost-aware in computational overhead and security such that the end-users can select the
most suitable outsourcing scheme according to their own constraints and demands. Also, ExpSOS can
be modified such that it is applicable to HCS, MM and MS model.
B. Numeric Results
In this section, we measure the performance of ExpSOS for modular exponentiation through simulation
in mobile phones. The computation of both the end-user and the cloud server is simulated in the same
phone Samsung GT-I9100 with Android 4.1.2 operating system. The CPU is Dual-core 1.2 GHz Cortex-
A9 with 1 GB RAM. In the outsourcing process, we focus on the computational gain, denoted as τ ,
from the outsourcing. We measure the local processing time (t0) to compute the modular exponentiation
ua mod N without outsourcing and the local processing time (ts) with outsourcing which includes the
problem transformation, result recovery and result verification. To measure the performance of ExpSOS
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under different levels of complexity, we let the size of the ring lN vary from 128 bits to 1024 bits. Also,
to show the cost-awareness of ExpSOS, we let the size of the security parameter lb vary from 4 bits to
16 bits. The processing time is averaged over 1000 independent rounds. The numeric result is shown in
Table II where each number stands for the average processing time for 100 rounds. We can see that when
the size of the ring lN increases, the performance gain τ also increases for the same security parameter b.
This means that when the original problem is more complex, ExpSOS would have a better performance.
The reason is that the complexity of modular exponentiation depends on the number of multiplications
that is positively correlated to the logarithm of the size of the ring lN . However, in ExpSOS the local
processing takes almost the same number of multiplications for a fixed security parameter b. We can
also see that there exists a trade-off between security and computational overhead. When b increases, the
computational overhead increases accordingly. Since the verifiability is 1− 12b2 , a bigger b means better
security guarantees.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a secure outsourcing scheme ExpSOS that can be widely used to outsource
general exponentiation operations for cryptographic computations, including modular exponentiation
and scalar multiplication. The proposed ExpSOS enables end-users to outsource the computation of
exponentiation to a single untrusted server at the cost of only a few multiplications. We also provide a
verification scheme such that the result is verifiable with probability 1− 12b2 . With the security parameter b,
ExpSOS is cost-aware in that it can provide different security levels at the cost of different computational
overhead. The comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that our scheme ExpSOS can significantly improves
the existing schemes in efficiency, security and result verifiability.
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